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FOREWORD: THE INTERACTION OF TAX
PLANNING AND TAX POLICY
PAUL R. MCDANIEL*
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 represents the first comprehensive revi-
sion of the federal taxes on the transfer of wealth in almost 35 years. From
the date of passage, however, the transfer tax aspects of the 1976 Act have
proved to be frustrating to tax planners and disappointing to those con-
cerned with tax policy. Both the disappointment and the frustration, I be-
lieve, have their origins in the same underlying causes and, indeed, may be
viewed as opposite sides of the same coin.
The fundamental problem with the transfer tax provisions enacted in
1976, extensive as the changes were, is that the provisions that emerged
represent only partial steps toward a more rational and equitable transfer
tax system. In most instances, therefore, the 1976 Act changes must be
viewed only as intermediate steps toward a more completely realized trans-
fer tax structure.
A number of factors in the 1976 legislative experience operated to
produce a set of transfer tax provisions that appear destined to be imper-
manent:
1. Revenue constraints in some instances prevented full im-
plementation of a more comprehensive policy, for example, in
the marital deduction area.
2. The lack of adequate technical analyses and empirical
studies in some instances resulted in only partial implementation
of more comprehensive policies that were approved in principle,
for example, in the generation-skipping area.
3. The lack of detailed studies and analyses which pre-
vented complete implementation of needed structural revisions,
for example, in the areas of retained voting stock and jointly
owned property, and the failure to address still other structural
defects, for example, the 5% reversionary requirement in section
2037.
4. The lobbying pressures generated by specific groups,
notably farm families, which produced new distortions in the tax
system as, for example, the special valuation rules in section
2036A, and which reduced the scope of the transfer taxes by in-
creasing the $60,000 exemption level to over $175,000.
* Professor of Law, Roston College Law School.
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5. The inability to reach consensus on the extent of changes
in certain areas where there was agreement on the necessity for
change, resulting in halfway measures acceptable really to no
one, as, for example, the carryover basis provisions.
6. The unusual legislative procedure employed to consider
the transfer tax provisions, namely the failure to provide full
Senate consideration, both in committee and on the floor, of the
measures passed by the House.
From the standpoint of the tax planner, as the articles in this volume
illustrate, the resulting incomplete and partially realized policy decisions re-
flected in the 1976 Act have generated substantial uncertainty and have
produced stresses on family estate planning that are artificial at best. From
the standpoint of tax policy, the existing transfer tax provisions fall con-
siderably short of a rational transfer tax structure. On the other hand, the
problems of the tax planner and the policy maker, viewed in historical per-
spective, are at least understandable when the 1976 Act changes are viewed
as an intermediate step moving the United States from an incomplete
transfer tax structure to a more fully developed system.
The articles in this volume are thus valuable because of the guidance
and assistance they provide to the tax advisor in working with 1976 Act
changes, and because they illuminate for the policy maker the partial na-
ture of the solutions adopted in 1976 and the steps that must be taken in
the future to bring to statutory fruition the policies on which the 1976 re-
forms were grounded. Accordingly, as always, the dynamic interaction be-
tween tax planners and tax .policy makers continues. Incompletely realized
policies produce unnecessary complexities and discontinuities for the tax
planner; the tax planning responses developed by the tax advisors in turn
reveal to policy makers both the problems with the existing provisions and
the necessity for more complete and rational statutory formulations.
The following remarks are intended to indicate in a brief and pre-
liminary way some of the lessons to be absorbed as one views the 1976 Act
changes from the perspective provided by the tax planners writing in this
volume. One thesis is that the task of the tax planner could be made more
rational and more simple by a transfer tax statute that fully implements
comprehensive and comprehensible tax policies. The second thesis is that
the problems faced by the tax planners in attempting to develop estate
plans under existing rules should reveal to the policy maker the areas that
need attention, both to curb abuses and to provide a coherent framework
within which tax collection and tax planning can function at an optimum
level.
Definition Of The Taxable Unit: The Marital Deduction. One of the structural
problems that must be resolved in implementing a tax on wealth transfers
is the definition of the taxable unit. In the case of single persons, of course,
the individual is the unit and transfers from that unit are subject to tax. In
the case of married couples, the question that must be resolved is whether
each spouse is to be treated as a separate taxable unit for transfer tax pur-
poses or whether the two spouses are to be treated as a single taxable unit,
with only transfers out of that unit subjected to tax.
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There is nothing in the nature of a transfer tax system as such that
dictates which of the two treatments with respect to married couples should
be adopted. Different countries can and do give different answers to the
question, the decisions appearing to rest largely on nontax views that the
country holds with respect to marital rights and relationships, on the sexual
pattern of holdings of wealth, and on marriage itself.
One model for the treatment of marital couples is the community
property system. Under such a regime, property acquired during marriage
is treated as being owned one half by each spouse from the date of acquisi-
tion. Transfers between the spouses and by each spouse are therefore in-
cluded in the transfer tax base of the transferring spouse. In a mugh way,
a 50% marital deduction conforms to this view.
On the other hand, the Tax Reform Studies and Proposals released
by the Treasury Department in 1969 moved toward regarding a married
couple as a single taxpaying unit for transfer tax purposes.' Under the un-
limited marital deduction proposal recommended by the Treasury, inter-
spousal transfers would not be subject to tax and only transfers outside the
unit would incur transfer tax liability. As will be discussed below, the 1969
Treasury proposals stopped short of . full implementation of the concept of
the married couple as a single taxable unit.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 mixed the two views of the marital unit,
predictably resulting in discontinuities and a lack of' rational cohesion in the
provision. For estates up to $250,000 (in excess of the exemption level), the
unlimited marital deduction concept advocated by the Treasury in 1969
was adopted. However, for estates above $500,000, the 50% deduction-
community property model was retained. No model exists to describe the
situation for treatment of the marital unit where the family estate is be-
tween $250,000 and $500,000!
As the article by Wilson C. Piper and Marion R. Fremont-Smith 2
graphically illustrates, this muddled situation presents both planning com-
plexities and planning opportunities. The difficulties are compounded by
the fact that the gift tax marital deduction does not conform to the estate
tax marital deduction. Hence the complex interaction between the desires
to achieve, on the one hand, optimal transfer tax deferral and, on the
other, the lowest aggregate overall tax burden on property passing to the
next. generation, analyzed in detail in the Piper and Fremont-Smith article,
is the inevitable result.
The 1976 legislation appears, however, to represent a movement to-
ward an unlimited marital deduction as the preferred solution to the defi-
nition of the taxable unit issue. Presumably, revenue constraints prevented
adoption of a completely unlimited marital deduction. The solution
adopted does solve one problem experienced mostly in smaller sized es-
tates. In such estates, where the surviving spouse consumed amounts of the
estate in excess of the marital deduction allowable to the estate of the first
I
 HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. AND SENATE FINANCE COMM. 9Isr CLING. 1ST SESS.. U.S.
TREAS. DEPT. TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 357-66, 377-&J (Comm. Print 1961 there-
inafter "1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS"].
2 See p. 403 infra.
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spouse the transfer tax was imposed on property that in fact did not pass
to the next generation. By effectively allowing an unlimited marital deduc-
tion for smaller sized estates, the 1976 legislation eliminated this problem.
But the conceptual issue of proper definition of the taxable unit is a
broader one and the present system seems unlikely to represent a perma-
nent resolution.
Adoption of a 100% marital deduction would of course provide com-
plete deferral of transfer tax until both spouses have died and the property
passes on to another taxable unit, usually the next generation. On the other
hand, providing complete transfer tax deferral to married couples does not
resolve all of the taxable unit problems. For example, if the theory underly-
ing the unlimited marital deduction is that husband and wife constitute a
single taxable unit, the question whether a single rate schedule should
apply to all transfers from that unit must be faced. That is to say, even if an
unlimited marital deduction were enacted, the potential for reducing
aggregate transfer taxes on the unit would continue if each spouse were
permitted to start. at the bottom of a separate rate schedule with respect to
transfers by him or her. Indeed, in some respects, an unlimited marital de-
duction that is not accompanied by a requirement that the spouses use a
single rate schedule intensifies the problems of the tax advisor because de-
cisions would be required 'upon the first spouse's death as to the amount
that should be subject to tax at that time and the amount on which tax de-
ferral should be accepted. The resolution of such issues not only would in-
volve complex mathematical computations based on some rather heroic as-
sumptions concerning life expectancy, need for funds, inflation, etc., but
also some of the attributes normally employed in Las Vegas.
Thus, estate planning will continue to be unnecessarily complex and
hazardous until the movement to an unlimited marital deduction is com-
pleted. But, more intensive analysis and study by the Treasury is required
with respect to the resolution of other matters involved in the taxable unit
issue:
1. Should a single rate schedule and exemption level be
applied to a married couple so that all transfers From the unit,
whether by the husband or by the wife, are taxed on a cumula-
tive basis?
2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative,
further questions must be faced as to the proper application of
such a taxable unit definition to the situations of divorce (i.e., is
this a taxable event or not, and if not, is a mechanism required
to retain the existing transfer tax potential as to the post-divorce
assets owned by each spouse, i.e., what transfer tax base does
each spouse have for subsequent transfers), and marriage itself
(i.e., is marriage a taxable event for transfer tax purposes since
two separate taxable units are now transferring their assets into a
new taxable unit, or .is some mechanism for deferral of the tax
appropriate at this point until there are actually transfers out of
the new unit, i.e., what is the transfer tax base of the marital
unit).
3. Do changing patterns of cohabitation require a revision




Resolution of the above issues will not be a simple matter. But the
push towards an unlimited marital deduction must at bottom be based on
the concept. that the marital unit constitutes a single taxable unit for trans-
fer tax purposes. If this is the concept., then the stated questions must be
directly laced, appro priate  data gathered, and the requisite technical
analysis undertaken to insure that. a comprehensive and workable definition
of the taxable unit. issue emerges.
The Concept Of Periodicity: The Generation
-Shipping Tax. Another structural
issue that must be resolved in the proper implementation of a transfer lax
is the time period within which the tax will be levied. In the context of a
transfer tax, the concept of periodicity requires that a tax be imposed on
transfers of property at least once each generation. Failure to apply such a
concept of periodicity results in an inevitable impairment of the equity of a
transfer lax system. For example, if a given amount of wealth under one
family arrangement is subject to transfer tax on three occasions over a 100
year period and a wealth accumulation of equal amount, by another family
is taxed only once each 100 years because of estate planning conducted by
the second family, it. is apparent. that the two family accumulations of
wealth are treated inequitably as compared to each other. As the ultimate
imposition of the transfer tax depends on an unpredictable event, death, it
is not possible to achieve complete equity in a transfer tax system in terms
of frequency of imposition of the tax; on the other handl, it nonetheless
seems apparent. that equity does require some reasonable equivalence of
time of imposition of the tax on two families, each transferring equal
amounts of wealth.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 the only real constraint on the
time period within which collection of a transfer tax was insured was the
applicable period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. As the article in this
volume by Thomas R. Belknap 3
 indicates, for properly advised families
wealth could be kept outside the transfer tax system for periods of 100-150
years. Even though no wealth transfer tax was imposed on the intervening
generations under such family arrangements, the skipped generations
nonetheless could receive substantial—indeed near total—economic enjoy-
ment, of the family wealth.
The generation-skipping tax imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1976
represents the first congressional attempt w introduce a formal element. of
periodicity into the federal transfer tax. The broad policy behind the 1976
legislation emerged relatively clearly: Wealth should be taxed once each
generation regardless of the form of transfer that might be selected for
nontax reasons by a particular donor or testator. However, as the Belknap
article clearly demonstrates, the technical implementation of this policy is so
deficient. that only a relatively few unlucky or ill-advised families will ever
incur any generation-skipping tax in fact.. The real result of the 1976 legis-
lation is the creation of' a series of artificial barriers around which the estate
planner must carefully chart his client's course. But under the guidance of
an experienced navigator, the family estate will likely emerge in the hands
See p. 433 iryia.
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of a suceeding generation 100 years hence with little or no more transfer
tax imposed than would have been true under pre-1976 law. The way has
been made more difficult, but the burden—with the possible exception of
increased attorneys' fees—has not been made significantly heavier.
Thus, while the 1976 generation-skipping legislation represents a sig-
nificant congressional policy commitment to achieve greater equity in the
transfer tax system, the Belknap article indicates that serious and probably
fatally defective gaps exist in the coverage of the generation-skipping tax.
These gaps are embodied in the exemptions from the tax provided by the
statute and include:
1. The failure to tax outright nontrust gifts to grandchil-
dren or more remote generations.
2. The failure to tax trusts that completely skip the inter-
vening generation (i.e., the so-called "layered" trust).
3. The $250,000 per child exemption for transfers in trust
fbr grandchildren.
4. The ability to employ children of the grantor as trustees,
under certain conditions, with the power to accumulate or dis-
tribute the income and principal of the trust to descendants of
the grantor.
5. The exemption for distributions of income that con-
stitute generation-skipping transfers.
6. The exemption for trusts created before April 30, 1976,
which permits some existing trusts to avoid the imposition of the
transfer taxes until well into the 21st century.
The article by Mr. Belknap thus serves not only as a roadmap to tax
advisors representing clientS potentially subject to the generation-skipping
tax, but also as a guide to the Treasury Department for areas in which it
needs to develop further data and more comprehensive statutory formula-
tions necessary to implement fully the policies on which the 1976
generation-skipping tax legislation was based.
The Concept Of Periodicity: Transfers Of Wealth That Avoid The Tax On The
Generation That Creates The Wealth. Most discussions of estate planning
commence with the assumption that the tax advisor is dealing with a person
who has accumulated significant amounts of wealth and who desires to pass
that wealth on to the surviving spouse and/or succeeding generations at the
minimum tax cost. But there is another aspect to the "generation-skipping"
problem that the articles by Frederick G. Corneel 4 and Lawrence 1. Silver-
stein5
 illuminate. They discuss tax planning methods—primarily developed
in the context of income tax planning rather than estate and gift tax plan-
ning—that permit the person who is in the process of creating wealth to
transfer future increments in that wealth tax-free. Under these arrange-
ments, the donor retains a relationship with the property transferred which
enables him by his efforts to continue increasing the value of the property
in the hands of the transferee. But that increased value falls outside the
See p. 509 infra.
See p. 467 infra.
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reach of the transfer tax. Congress in it 1976 actions to amend section
2036(a)(1) took a quick glance through the door that opens on to this pro-
mised land in which the parent or grandparent who is in the process of
making an asset — such as the stock in a closely held corporation — con-
tinually more valuable through his or her own efforts is simultaneously
transferring that increased value to succeeding generations at no transfer
tax cost.
One familiar vehicle employed to achieve this result is the so called
Dean-Hartzell recapitalization." Under this plan, the older generation own-
ing stock in a closely held corporation freezes estate tax values at present
levels by retaining preferred stock (perhaps voting) equal to the total cur-
rent value of the corporation, and transferring the common stock in which
all future growth will inhere to children or grandchildren, or to a trust for
them. The donor will continue to manage the affairs of the corporation,
but the transfer in value effected through his or her efforts will go un-
taxed. As the student note' in this volume indicates, Congress caught a
glimpse of the world of this type of generation-skipping transfers when it
addressed the problem created by the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Byrum. Et
Again, however, probably because tax technicians have not really ex-
plored the area, the amendment to section 2036(a)( I), providing that a
transfer of stock with retention of the voting rights will require inclusion of'
the transferred stock in the donor's gross estate, will cause difficulty only
for the ill advised. As Mr. Corneel points out, if the donor's tax advisor
simply uses the device of a recapitalization in which voting stock is retained
and nonvoting stock is transferred, presumably the amendment to section
2036(a)(1) will not offer any obstacle. And, as his article points out, the re-
capitalization is only one of several techniques by which the donor can in-
sure that all future growth in existing assets will occur in the hands of the
heirs and beneficiaries of' the donor, even though that future growth is at-
tributable solely to efforts of or actions taken by the donor.
Research is in an embryonic state on the scope of the problem that ex-
ists as the result of tax planning devices developed to enable owners of
property to transfer future increases in value of that property free of
transfer tax." Careful and detailed research is required to develop the types
of devices employed to reach this result, to identify those situations in
which a transfer tax should apply, and to devise statutory formulae that
will, with the requisite precision, differentiate those situations which should
be encompassed by the transfer tax and those which should not.
It is, however, imperative that such research and analysis begin in
earnest. A mature and fully developed transfer tax system that effectively
deals with traditional generation-skipping transfers inevitably will be re-
See Dean v, Commissioner, 10 T.C. 19 (1948) (A); Hartzell v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 492 (1939) (A).
' See p. 597 infra.
s 408 U.S. 1'25 (1972).
See, e.g., S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANS-
FER TAXATION 956-62 (1977) [hereinalicr WrA1:r]t TRANSFER TA xxrioN); Cooper, A Voluntary
Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticaled Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 Coi.i2M. L. Et.E.v. 161 (1977).
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quire(' to deal with transfers that skip the generation that is in the process
of creating the wealth. To put the matter another way, if the United States
had in place a properly implemented generation-skipping transfer tax,
enormous pressure would be placed on devices that would skip the wealth-
creating generation. Thus, research on the types of transfers that produce
this latter result must. be the inevitable concomitant of research for more
effective statutory responses to the traditional generation-skipping problem.
In this regard, the planning techniques suggested by Messrs. Corneel
and Silverstein reveal two promising avenues for research:
1. Development of more refined valuation techniques than
are preSently available.
2. Development. of more stringent "hard to complete gift"
rules whereby the date of death value would be included in the
gross estate of the donor in any situation in which the donor has
retained the power or the ability to contribute to the post-gift in-
crease in value and thus to affect the beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
Development of legal rules to implement either approach will present
difficult conceptual and practical problems. But the lesson implicitly of-
fered by the tax planners for the tax policy makers is that it is essential that
the requisite data gathering and analysis be undertaken.
Definition Of The Tax Base. As in the case of the income tax, the provisions
that make up the estate, gift and generation-skipping tax portions of the
Internal Revenue Code—the transfer tax system—are in fact of two
quite separate types. One set of provisions consists of those rules that are
necessary to implement the normative structure of a transfer tax, i.e., the
transfers covered, the rates of tax to be applied, the definition of the tax-
able unit, the time period within which the tax is to be imposed, and the
administrative provisions necessary to implement the tax. But another set
of provisions performs quite a different function: These provisions are de-
signed to provide federal financial assistance or incentives for particular
types of transferors or property transferred. The latter set of provisions
encompasses the "tax expenditure" structure of the transfer tax system." )
Congress in the 1976 Act did not deal comprehensively with either com-
ponent of the transfer tax system. It did address, however, particular items
within each component.
One new provision intended to constitute part of the normative struc-
ture was section 2518. As the article by William Schwartz indicates," the
1976 amendments reflect an effort by Congress to provide a uniform defi-
nition of a qualified disclaimer and to bring to an end uncertainties which
had plagued the area for many years. On the other hand, as the Schwartz
article also points out, section 2518 does not completely or satisfactorily
achieve either objective. The Ways and Means Committee did not appear
to have provided for it the conceptual framework within which to analyze
the disclaimer question. While Congress did provide some greater certainty,
it did so by liberalizing the disclaimer rules. It is clear that the policy objec-
1 " Fiir a discussion of the tax expenditure concept in the context of the transfer tax sys-
tem and the formulation of a tax expenditure budget for that system, see WEALTI I TRANSFER
TAx.vrios.mpra note 9, at 881-92.
'' See p. 551 infra,
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Live could also have been achieved by tightening the then existing dis-
claimer rules. The crucial question which should have been presented to
Congress by the Treasury arid the Joint Committee staff was, therefore,
which was the proper direction to take—liberalization or restriction—in a
properly structured transfer tax system.
The matter may be examined by comparing the following cases.' 2
Case l: A by will leaves nothing to B and $200,000 to C, ,B
and C each possessing $100,000 estates prior to A's death.
Case 2: Before his death, A consults with B and B indicates
that he prefers that. A leave his entire $200,000 estate to C, B
feeling that. he had a sufficient estate for his own needs.
Case 3: A by will leaves $100,000 to B and $100,000 to C;
five years later, B decides that, he does not need his $100,000
bequest because of his other assets and makes a gift in that
amount to C.
Case 4: The same as case 3, except that immediately after
A's death, B effectively disclaims his $100,000 bequest and, pur-
suant to A's will, the $100,000 goes to C.
It is clear that there is no gift by B to C in either Cases 1 or 2. It is
equally clear that B has made a gift to C in Case 3. The disclaimer rules
adopted in 1976 assume that Case 4 is more like Cases I and 2 than like
Case 3. is the matter, however, so clear? In Case I, B's estate remains at
$100,000, C's estate is increased by $200,000 and no action on B's part af-
fects that fact. In Case 3, B's action has transferred $100,000 to C, with a
resulting gift tax. in Cases 2 and 4, B's action in conjunction with A's ef-
fects a $100,000 transfer to C, yet. no gift tax results. If one feels that no
gill. should result in Case 2, should the tax result differ in Case 4 because
B in effect has been given a second chance to evaluate his decision by vir-
tue of the disclaimer rules? In Case 4, B can be regarded as having re-
ceived the $100,000 and then transfering it to C, through the medium of
A's estate, and the $100,000 will in fact go to C who is the object of B's
bounty (as in Case 3).
Obviously, the congressional desire for "uniformity" could have been
achieved in 1976 by tighter rather than by liberalized disclaimer rules. It is
not. totally self-evident that. in the range of the cases presented above, Case
4 should bear no gift tax, whereas Case 3 should. Further study on the
issue by the Treasury Department. is warranted, taking into account the
kinds ()I' problems and opportunities discussed by Mr. Schwartz under the
1976 Act rules.
Another structural issue partially addressed by Congress in the 1976
Act. was the disparity in the tax base that existed between gift transfers and
transfers at death. Two aspects of this disparity—lower gill tax rates and
separate rate schedules For lifetime and death transfers—were resolved by
providing for a single unified rate structure cumulatively applicable both to
lifetime and deathtime transfers. The third disparity that existed prior to
the 1976 Act was not, however, completely resolved. Transfers at death are
grossed-up by the estate tax itself .; however, transfers during life are subject.
"Ser WEALTH TRANSFER TAXAT1oN, supra nose 9, at 194-95.
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to tax only on the net amount transferred to the donee and do not include
the amount of the gift tax. Obviously, the burden of the two taxes is not
neutral when comparing lifetime and deathtime transfers.
Congress recognized this problem in 1976, but attempted a solution
only in the case of transfers made within three years of death. Under sec-
tion 2035(c), discussed in a student note," the gross estate includes not
only the value of property transferred within three years of death but also
the gift tax paid thereon. The technique adopted in section 2035(c) is not a
true gross-up solution.
In a correctly implemented gross-up system, the amount of a gift., re-
gardless of when made, would include not only the amount received by the
donee, but also the gift tax imposed on the transaction as well. At the same
time, if a completed gift were made, all future appreciation in the value of
the property transferred would be eliminated from the donor's gross estate.
Under section 2035(c), by contrast, the gift itself is not grossed-up by the
gift tax paid, thus permitting a deferral of tax for up to three years. In,
stead, the gift tax is computed only on the net amount received by the
donee and, equally inconsistent with a proper gross-up technique, apprecia-
tion in the value of the property transferred within three years of death
remains in the gross estate. Perhaps a rough trade off is involved here, i.e.,
the failure to apply a proper gross-up technique is offset by requiring in-
clusion of the post-gift appreciation in value in the donor's gross estate.
But, as the student. note indicates, this partial solution to a structural prob-
lem inevitably brings with it unnecessary complexities and difficulties.
Again, while the underlying policy issue addressed by Congress was clear,
that is, gross-up is the proper rule for lifetime transfers, additional statu-
tory amendments are necessary to implement a correctly structured system
to tax all lifetime transfers on a grossed-up basis.
Congress in the 1976 Act also addressed certain items in the tax ex-
penditure component of the transfer tax system. For example, as discussed
in the article by Judith Lidsky," the exemption for qualified annuities
under section 2039(c) and (e) was expanded. This expansion, which will
produce an estimated revenue loss in fiscal 1979 of $85 million, was unac-
companied by any analyses of the role which the exemption would play in
the overall transfer tax system or evaluations of the provisions as a method
of encouraging and supplementing private retirement plans. For example,
it seems clear that the section 2039(c), (e) exemptions will be of benefit only
to a ratified stratum within the already highly rarified group of estates that
incur estate tax liability. By virtue of the exemption level that will reach
$175,625 in 1981, 98% of decedents each year will pay no estate tax. The
section 2039(c), (e) exemptions obviously provide no benefits to these es-
tates. Moreover, as the Piper and Freemont-Smith" article demonstrates,
the exemption will not be of any benefit for estates up to $425,000 where
the marital deduction is employed, and indeed, with more sophisticated
planning, it is possible that the exemption would prove of no benefit for es-
tates up to $600,000 in value where a surviving spouse is involved. Thus, at
13
 See p. 577 infra.
14 See p. 531 infra.
" See p. 403 infra.
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best, the section 2039(c) and (e) exemptions provide a federal financial
benefit to supplement death benefitS payable to the wealthiest one to two
percent of the people in the country. As one point of comparison, it seems
unlikely that Congress would aniend the social security system to exclude
surviving beneficiaries of the bottom 98% of the population from receiving
death benefits, and provide death benefits only to the beneficiaries of the
wealthiest two percent of the decedents dying each year.'"
One clear task for the Treasury Department is the identification and
quantification of tax expenditures within the existing transfer tax system.
Moreover, studies must be commenced to evaluate such programs under
criteria applied to direct spending programs in the same budget areas. By
fiscal 1981, existing tax expenditures in the transfer tax system will total an
estimated $3.3 billion (a figure which will be very close to the revenues
actually collected through the transfer taxes in that year). 17 The expendi-
tures of federal funds at this level simply cannot continue unexamined and
unevaluated as have the tax expenditures in the transfer tax system to date.
Level Of' Taxation. The question of the appropriate level of the transfer tax
burden raises two issues: (I) the point at which positive rates should com-
mence (i.e., the extent of the exemption), and (2) the configuration of pos-
itive rates applied above the exemption level. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
addressed both these issues by substantially increasing the exemption level
and modifying the positive rate structure.
The 1976 Act replaced the existing $60,000 estate tax exemption (and
$30,000 gift tax exemption) with a unified transfer tax credit that, when
fully phased in by 1981, will be $47,000. This is the equivalent, though not
identical in effect, of a $175,625 exemption. Two questions may be raised
about the unified transfer tax credit. First, was it appropriate to substitute a
credit for the exemption? Second, was the exemption level created by the
credit appropriate?
As to the first question, the House Ways and Means Committee Re-
port indicated that the estate tax exemption should be replaced by a tax
credit because the value of the credit will not increase as a function of the
decedent's estate tax bracket as does an exemption.'" It is difficult to dis-
cern a conceptual basis for the use of the tax credit as a substitute for a
basic transfer tax exemption other than a desire to have wealthier estates
incur a disguised tax increase relative to smaller estates.'• The Ways and
Means Committee Report asserted, in erred, that an estate in a 70% estate
tax bracket derives .a relatively greater benefit from an exemption than
does an estate that achieves a maximum estate tax bracket of, say, 37%. It
then concluded from this fact that the exemption should be changed to a
credit to eliminate this effect, i.e., a credit would give the same dollar bene-
fit to the 37% bracket estate as to the 70% bracket estate. The problem is
'" A similar lack of analysis accompanied the introduction in the 1976 Act of new tax
expenditures for farm owners (section 2032A) and orphans (sections 2057). See FEDERAL
WEALTH TAXATION,Mpra note 9, at 1097-1109, 875-78.
17 id. at 881-92.
See H,R. REP, No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15.16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Corn. &
LONG. AD , NEWS 3356.
! 4 The textual material between notes 19 and 20 was taken directly from WEALTH
TRANSEER TAXATiots„cupra note 9, at 830-31.
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that the same statement can be made about every tax bracket below 37%.
The following analysis indicates, for example, that taxation of $5,000 at a
32% rate provides a relatively greater benefit to the 70% bracket estate
than to the 37% bracket estate.
It was asserted that taxation of $60,000 at the zero rate provided by
the prior exemption was "worth" $42,000 to the 70% bracket estate (70%
times $60,000), but only $22,200 to the 37% bracket estate (37% times
$60,000). But, by the same analysis, taxation of $5,000 at 32% is "worth"
$1,900 to the 70% bracket estate, but only $250 to the 37% bracket estate.
The "worth" figure is derived by subtracting the bracket under considera-
tion (zero or 32% in our examples) from the maximum marginal rate
achieved by the estate (70 and 37% in our examples). In other words, one
concludes mathematically that a $60,000 exemption is "worth" $42,000 to
the 70% bracket estate by subtracting zero from 70 and multiplying the dif-
ference by the amount of property in the estate taxed at the zero rate. The
same mathematical calculation shows the "worth" to the 70% bracket estate
of having each block of property in the estate taxed at the brackets below
70%. Thus, for the 70% bracket estate, taxation of $5,000 at 32% is
"worth" $1,900, because the benefit is computed by subtracting 32% from
70% and multiplying the difference by $5,000. This "worth" may then be
compared to that computed for the 37% bracket estate in the same fashion,
i.e., 37% minus 32% times $5,000 equals $250, which is the "worth" to the
37% bracket estate of applying a 32% rate to $5,000 of assets (rather than
its top marginal rate of 37%).
Under the above analysis, it would be as logical to replace the 32%
bracket with a tax credit as it was to replace the exemption (the zero rate
bracket) with a tax credit. But no one ever suggests such action with respect
to any of the positive rate brackets. Or, to put the matter another way, re-
placing the exemption with a credit placed an absolute dollar limit on the
"benefit" of the zero rate bracket. But why should such a limit be placed on
the zero bracket as opposed to some other rate bracket?
The "relative worth" argument thus does not directly support the
conclusion that the prior exemption should have been replaced with a tax
credit. The "relative worth" analysis applies to every tax bracket below 70%
and simply describes an effect inherent in a progressive rate structure. It is
perfectly appropriate to employ a zero rate bracket_ in a progressive trans-
fer tax structure. Hence, under the "relative worth" argument, it was as in-
appropriate to replace this bracket with a tax credit as it would have been
to replace any other tax bracket. 2 °
The issue that Congress should have addressed in 1976 was the
proper width of the zero bracket provided by an exemption as compared to
the width of the positive tax brackets and the effect of this differential on
the relative distribution of estate tax liabilities as between estates of' differ-
ent sizes. Such an analysis might well have led to a restructuring of the pos-
itive rate structure (as Congress did in 1976), but not to the adoption of a
tax credit in lieu of the exemption. Application of proper tax principles
would recognize the propriety of employing an exemption as a zero bracket
and would focus attention on the appropriate width of that bracket in a
transfer tax structure employing progressive positive rates. The political
2 " Id, at 830-31.
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difficulty and the revenue cost of increasing the exemption plus increasing
rates on the wealthiest estates apparently led Congress to achieve the same
result by a less direct technique.
Of equal concern was the failure of Congress in the 1976 Act to reach
a consensus on the proper role that, a transfer tax should play in the
United States. The increase in the exemption level from $60,000 to
$175,625 means that by 1981 less than 2% of decedents dying each year
will incur a transfer tax liability. Even under the prior $60,000 exemption,
only 7% of decedents each year paid an estate tax. These figures bring
home an important point. Estate planners are accustomed to speaking of
"small" and "medium sized" estates. But. we must keep in mind that the
universe to which these terms apply is a highly rarified one. The "small" es-
tate to which the estate planners refer is the estate that ranges from
perhaps $175,000 to $400,000. But this is an accumulation of wealth that
98% of Americans will never reach. Only 2/10 of 1% of adult decedents
leave "middle sized" estates—those over $500,000. These facts simply re-
flect that. the ownership of wealth in the United States is highly concen-
trated. The top 2.5% of households own 45% of the total wealth; the top
7.5% control about 60% of the total wealth; and the top 20% of households
own about 70% of the total wealth of the country."
When these data are taken into account., the action of Congress in in-
creasing the $60,000 exemption to a level equal to $175,625 seems dubious
indeed. Prior to 1976, one would have thought that in the wealthiest. coun-
try in the world, the problem was that its one tax on wealth covered only
7% of the population. Instead, Congress viewed the problem from the op-
posite end of the telescope, i.e., that in the wealthiest country in the world
a wealth tax covering 7% of the population was too expansive in its scope.
A number of potential objectives can be assigned to a transfer tax—
generation of government revenues, redistribution of wealth, reenforce-
ment of a progressive income tax system, limiting inheritance to increase
equality of opportunity and to enhance the incentive for each generation to
produce its own economic resources, etc. The seeming inability to reach a
national consensus on which of these objectives should be accomplished by
a wealth transfer tax system in the United States, accompanied by a rational
and comprehensive statutory structure to achieve the identified objectives,
inevitably has resulted in a transfer tax structure that. is less than optimal
from any standpoint. This in turn means that. the task of the tax planner
will continue to be a difficult and hazardous one as compromises and half-
way measures proliferate in our transfer tax structure.
The Taxation Of Accrued Gains In Property Transferred Al Death Or By GO. The
most controversial of the changes enacted in 1976 affecting estate planning
was one associated with the income tax, rather than with the transfer taxes.
This change, of course, was the application in section 1023 to transfers at
death of the carryover basis concept. Of all the provisions discussed in this
volume, section 1023 in its enacted Form appears least likely to survive for
any significant period of time. This prediction of a short life for present
section 1023 is founded on the view that carryover basis represents an an-
swer to an important question, that is, what is the proper income tax
''
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treatment of accrued gains on property transferred at death or by gift, but
it is an answer which no one suggested should be adopted. At one pole
were the tax reformers who asserted, consistent with the 1969 Treasury
Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, 22
 that the correct solution was the im-
position of an income tax on gains in property transferred at death or by
gift. At the other extreme were those who desired to retain the exemption
from tax accorded by section 1014, especially vocal in this group being rep-
resentatives of farm interests. Carryover basis is an answer to the income
tax problem; but it is an answer that has few visible supporters.
Moreover, the impermanent nature of the solution to the problem
contained in section 1023 is likely to be emphasized by the already iden-
tified difficulty—some would say impossibility—of working with the various
adjustments to the decedent's basis in an asset. Even if the section is
amended to correct its rather patent technical deficiencies (as has been rec-
ommended by the Treasury Department), it seems unlikely that any
"clean-up" measure will reduce the efforts either of tax reformers to pro-
ceed on to a system of full taxation of gains at death or of those who seek
to return to the complete exemption system of section 1014. 23 As the Sil-
verstein article reveals, 24 such a continuing unsettled state in the legislative
arena inevitably produces corresponding uncertainties and complexities for
the tax planner who must develop estate plans today for an uncertain fu-
ture.
In this area, as in those previously mentioned, it is essential that the
Treasury Department develop more precise data than has to date been
available concerning the extent of the appreciation in assets—and the type
of property that constitutes the appreciated assets—transferred at death or
by gift. Congress in the 1976 Act expressed dissatisfaction with the in-
equities created by the old exemption system embodied in section 1014; but
it was not prepared to adopt a system for taxing accrued gains at death or
by gift which is at once more equitable and workable. The stakes in the
issue are very large—the failure to tax accrued gains at death will involve a
revenue loss in fiscal 1979 of an estimated $9 billion, and this figure is es-
timated to increase to over $13.5 billion by fiscal 1983. 25 With such
amounts involved, it is clear that even a carefully worked out, comprehen-
sive and administerable system for taxing accrued gains on transfers at
death or by gift will not be easily enacted; but it is even more clear that the
failure to develop such a set of provisions can only result in a prolongation
of the uncertainties and complexities that beset tax planners at the present
time. 2 "
22 1969 TREASURY PROPOSAI.S,Pipra !lute 1, at 107-10, 331-40.
2)
 Compare 123 CONG. Ric. S11.108 (daily ed. July 1, 1977) (Senator Kennedy proposed
full taxation of accrued gains in property transferred at death or by gift) with 123 CONG. REe.
E1,603 (daily ed. March 18, 1977) (Representative Conable urged repeal of section 1023 and a
return to the step-up in basis system for assets transferred at death).
24 See p. 467 infra.
23 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 95TH CONG., 2d SESS., ESTIMATES or FEDERAL. TAX
EXPENDITURES 6 (Comm. Print March 14, 1978).
" The articles in this volume discuss various types of uncertainties confronting tax ad-
visors after the 1976 changes in this and the other areas previously discussed, including those
caused by new concepts, incomplete or complex statutory formulations of the new rules, etc.
In addition, another type of uncertainty is involved for tax planners: When the future
changes that seem inevitable are made, to what extent will (or should) arrangements entered
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Conclusion. While there is thus much to criticize in the congressional resolu-
tion of issues dealing with the transfers of accumulated wealth in the 1976
Act, there are also hopeful signs both for tax planners and tax policy mak-
ers." On major issues such as generation-skipping, the marital deduction,
and the income taxation of accrued gains on property transferred at. death
or by gift, Congress clearly recognized the inadequacies and inequities of
the pre-1977 law. In each of these areas, the 1976 Act reflects congres-
sional movement. toward more rational and equitable tax policies. In each
case, however, various pressures and lack of adequate technical support.
produced only partial implementation of the policy goals identified. The
legislative draftsmen can write a statute that is only as sound as the policy
instructions given to them by the tax writing committees and the research
that has preceded the legislative consideration of the problem. The in-
adequacies, complexities and, in some instances, outright, errors contained
in the 1976 legislation reflect this fact. From the standpoint of the estate
planner, these statutory deficiencies produce both unnecessary frustrations
and complexities, with resulting increased costs to clients, and new oppor-
tunities for planning for tax minimization.
The articles in this symposium volume represent a resource equally
valuable for tax planners who Enlist of necessity work with the tools given
to them in the 1976 Act—inadequate and lacking in rational coherence in
many instances as those tools may be—and for those responsible for for-
mulating tax policy who should discern from the problems and opportuni-
ties encountered by tax planners the areas in which detailed study and re-
search are required the United States is to move toward a mature system
of taxation of transfers of accumulated wealth.
into currently be "grandfathered"? That is, how far can tax planners rely on the continued
applicability of existing, law to estate plans developed under existing rules? See Graetz, Legal
Transitions. : The Cave of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. Rt.'s, 47 (1977).
27 For a discussion of the .1976 Act, see Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
25 Cu:v. ST. L REV. 303 (1976),
